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Abstract 
This research paper is focused on the exploration of the impediments to beneficial trade and their 
resultant market transaction arrangement in maize and rice. The study therefore was confined to the 
following three specific objectives to first, explore perceptions and experiences on the impediments to 
beneficial trade among rice and maize growers and their socio-economic impacts for farmers and food 
security in the study area. Second, to identify production and marketing models and describe their 
structure, conduct and performance; and thirdly, to describe transaction costs and related impediments 
in the value added chain for both crops in Tanzania. Survey was done in three regions: Shinyanga 
region representing rice growing regions and Ruvuma and Iringa regions representing maize growing 
regions of Tanzania. The study involved a sample of 100 smallholder rice farmer traders and 131 maize 
farmer traders. This study adapted Williamsonian Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) approach (as 
applied in Pitelis (1993) and Furubotn et al. (2000) to identify market arrangements based on 
transaction costs of producing and trading in the two grain crops. Based on the observed farmers’ 
perception and experiences with prevailing trade impediments, this study has proposed five stylized 
market arrangements referred to in this paper as Cereal Transaction Arrangements (CTAs). Each of 
these CTAs was found to have strengths and weaknesses—hence no single trade policy could be more 
appropriate across all CTAs. The paper recommends that the government should reduce transactions 
costs in CTA4 and also CTA5 which involve more progressive commercial farmers by putting in place 
pro-poor trade policies. Such transaction costs include cost of identifying weighing devices, 
constructing warehouses, corruption, levies and quantitative trade restrictions.  
Keywords  
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1. Introduction 
Maize and rice form the main staple grain food crops in Tanzania. Most smallholder farmers produce 
maize and rice not only for household consumption but also for sale. As such the two crops have 
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become important cash crops for smallholder farmers. In the process of trading, smallholder farmers 
have faced state trade impediments especially when it involved grain trade across borders in the good 
faith of ensuring food security. As a result the government has also been putting in place trade policies, 
regulations and standing orders for these staples (URT, 2005). Although such policies may have 
favoured some farmers, it’s likely that some others are hardly hit by the same policies. The negative 
impact of such policies is also reflected in the thinness of the grain market over years, increasing food 
insecurity amongst vulnerable groups and increasing income poverty among grain farmer traders in the 
country. This calls for repeated review of the policy induced trade huddles and propose means to cope 
with them and/or propose better pro-poor polices. Numerous researches have been carried out in the 
country with regard to rice and maize production and marketing in Tanzania (Amani et al, 2003; ESRF, 
2004; Kilima, 2006; Oxfam, 2008, RLDC, 2008; Kagira, 2009). Focus of these researches has been 
varied but in one way or another at least each of the researches has been able to identify the major 
barriers to beneficial trade in grain products. The commonly identified potential barriers in the rice sub 
sector include, inter alia, insufficient input suppliers and extension workers; inadequate storage 
capacity; high post harvest losses due to poor post-harvest handling and uses of inefficient milling 
machines. With regard to maize, the study reports that, the sub sector channels are characterized by 
lengthy breakage services dominating at village, district, and national urban markets. With regards to 
transactions, the studies reveal that, rice transactions tend to be negotiated between buyer and seller on 
a one off basis or to result from a formal public sector procurement process, which is complex and time 
consuming. As a result, they require a great deal of additional specification and often intense 
negotiation. In other words they incur large transaction costs and are inherently more risky.  
Another form of barrier as identified by the report is in form of market protocols. The prevailing 
market protocols, which apply in the rice trade, differ from global to region. The market protocols 
which exist in Tanzania are also quite different for maize and rice. It has been revealed that, no formal 
commodity exchange exists in the country, so the work of setting trading terms and conditions is 
performed by other means. Approximately 14% of the maize traded in the nation (Estimated at 1.4 
million tons in 2009) purchased either by the WFP and/or with National Food Reserve Agency. Trading 
with these two institutions requires conformance with the procurement terms, which they mandate. 
Thus, this trade comes close to structured trade. Also the large domestic traders, namely Mohammed 
Enterprises, S.S. Bakhresa & Co and Export Trading, Olam (T) Ltd and Fidahussein have developed 
broad buying networks of their own within the country and their purchases from local farmers, traders 
and farmer associations are rule based as well. Although the prices offered are amongst the lowest, 
farmers and local traders continue transacting with them.  
Studies conducted by FAO (FAO, 2009) across the continent reveal that it is only in Tanzania where 
there exists application of food crop taxation. This is at the local government level where the Authority 
taxes both export and food crops. The effect of taxation is the reduction of farmers’ revenue from crop 
sales because traders buy at lower prices to compensate for the taxes. The level of taxation varies 
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across districts because taxes are collected by Local Government Authorities (LGAs). LGA’s levies or 
cess were partly responsible for the low shares of producers’ income from trade. In the 1992 Finance 
Act, the Government directed LGAs not to tax agricultural products in excess of 5 percent of farm-gate 
selling price. A World Bank (2009) study on regional maize market and marketing costs reported that: 
 Protectionist measures through export bans lead to lost opportunities for farmers and traders, 
who then reduces their investment in production in subsequent seasons leading to overall 
reduction in food production;  
 Apart from reducing potential outputs, arbitrary bans on selling of cereals leads to reduction 
in quality, quantity and value, causing losses to the economy as a whole; and  
 The export bans and other trade restrictions scare away private sector development and 
investments in the food sub-sector, leading to sluggish growth in the sub-sector, and lost 
opportunities for farmers and consumers.  
1.1 Maize Marketing 
Maize is a key staple food for the majority of Tanzanian households. Production of maize is carried out 
in almost all regions in Tanzania, though levels of production differ. Maize is largely farmed under 
rain-fed conditions by smallholders. Although exports of almost all agricultural commodities are 
liberalized, maize exports continue to be subject to occasional export bans. The main maize surplus 
region in Tanzania is the southern highlands, including the regions of Mbeya, Iringa, Rukwa, and 
Ruvuma. Because the southern highlands borders on northern Zambia and Mozambique, which are 
maize deficit zones, there is a strong economic incentive for maize exports, particularly during June 
and July when the southern highlands harvest takes place. Government policy is to allow the export of 
maize only when all regions of the country can be declared to be food secure. In practice, however, 
there is almost always a problem of food security in some part of the country, particularly in the 
semi-arid central region. Thus, in practice, maize exports are banned on an almost continual basis. The 
effect of this policy is to make the prices of maize in the southern highlands lower and more volatile 
than they would otherwise be. For instance, maize prices in Songea and Mbeya are lower and more 
volatile than in other parts of Tanzania. At the same time, the export ban presumably keeps the price of 
maize lower in deficit regions that it would otherwise be (Minot, 2010). 
With the failure of the National Milling Corporation (NMC) in late 1980s, the Strategic Grain Reserve 
(SGR) was established in 1991. The objectives of the SGR are to advise the government on food 
security policy, supply food for emergency assistance, and stabilize staple grain prices. The SGR 
engages in procurement and distribution operations through seven depots, three in surplus zones in the 
southern highlands and four in deficit zones (Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Dodoma, and Shinyanga). The 
capacity of the SGR is 150 thousand tons, but in practice the quantities in storage have generally been 
in the range of 50-80 thousand tons. The SGR has not been successful in stabilizing grain prices. The 
volume of purchases and sales in a given year is generally less than 50 thousand tons, which is 
negligible compared to the volume of Tanzanian grain production (5 million tons) or even marketed 
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surplus (roughly 1.25 million tons). In addition, the SGR suffers from bureaucratic procedures, political 
interference, under-utilization of capacity, and chronic operating deficits due to pricing policies that do 
not allow cost recovery. On the other hand, the global food crisis has increased the political support for 
tools to manage staple food price volatility (Mndogo, 2008; Minot, 2010). 
1.2 Rice Marketing 
Rice is Tanzania`s second most important staple good (ESRF, 2004; Kilima, 2006). Rice is mainly 
produced by small-scale farmers and marketed by the private sector and large scale production is under 
the National Food Company (DAEA, 1999). Due to long distances, information from Dar es Salaam’s 
wholesale market about prices and information about improved means of production rarely reach farms 
and actors on the small-town level. This information asymmetry leads farmers to sell their products at 
lower prices than they could acquire and to produce irrational amounts (DAI, 2003). The rice 
sub-sector is not heavily regulated. The main areas where regulation occurs is for exports (regulated by 
the Strategic Grain Reserve) and at the district cess. Export permits are required for anyone who desires 
to export rice from Tanzania. The Director of the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) issues these permits. A 
cess is charged at the district level on each bag of rice leaving the district, which varies by each district 
(ESRF, ibid). 
The paper thus focuses on principle root causes for the existing impediments with a view to provide 
working policy recommendations. This study therefore was confined to the following three specific 
objectives: 
(i) To explore perceptions and experiences on the impediments to beneficial trade among rice 
and maize growers and their socio-economic impacts for farmers and food security in the study 
area. 
(ii) To identify production and marketing models and describe their structure, conduct and 
performance.  
(iii) To describe transaction costs and related impediments in the value added chain of both 
crops in Tanzania. 
The paper is divided into four main parts. The first part covers introduction, followed by the review of 
the methodological approaches. The third section covers research findings and finally conclusion and 
recommendations are covered in section four. 
 
2. Methodological Approach 
A descriptive research design was employed in this study where mainly qualitative approaches were 
used. Sample populations of farmers for this study were selected through identification of areas that are 
known as high producers of rice and maize. Farmers were sampled from two villages in Kahama 
district in Shinyanga, two villages from Songea rural district, and two villages from Iringa rural district 
in the southern highlands zone. Three major data collection tools namely Questionnaires, Interviews 
and Focus Group Discussion were used. Multiple sources of evidence were taken into account so as to 
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validate the obtained information. A total of 100 smallholder rice farmers were involved in the Survey 
in Kahama district whereas 131 maize farmers did respond to the survey questionnaire in both Songea 
and Iringa. In order to obtain additional information interviews were conducted with 25 farmers and 
traders in Songea, five in Iringa and seven in Kahama. The interviews were deep, covering all the 
prescribed variables and indicators. The interviews facilitated easy gain of information that came out 
from personal views, opinions and perspectives. Most of the interviewees were key informants with 
basic knowledge about production and marketing of the crops. This study adapted Williamsonian 
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) approach as applied in Pitelis (1993) and Furubotn et al. (2000) to 
identify and examine transaction costs of producing and trading in the two grain crops. Knowing that 
the traditional theoretical models like S-C-P Market Model, Transaction Cost economics or even the 
neoclassical perfect competition models cannot be very reliable when applied independently, a mixture 
of all these theoretical foundations to explaining markets were applied to come up with the five 
different transaction arrangements for the two staple crops. 
 
3. Findings and Discussions 
3.1 Socioeconomic Attributes of Surveyed Farmers 
3.1.1 Demographic Characteristics of Sample Farmers 
It is indicated in table 1 that male farmers dominate the two crops compared to their female 
counterparts where 83.8% and 83.0% were males maize and rice farmers respectively. This explains 
that although pre-harvest activities could be mainly a female business, the males dominate the 
postharvest processes, including marketing and related crop negotiations. Table 2 indicates that the 
average age of farmers was about 43 years and 40 years respectively for maize and rice farmers. This 
implies that the farming population in these staples generally comprises of youths and it is likely that 
youths are engaged in these crops mainly for commercial purposes i.e. production of surplus for sales 
income.  
 
Table 1. Farmers distribution by gender  
Gender Crops  Frequency Valid Percent 
Male Maize  109 83.8 
Rice  83 83.0 
Female Maize  21 16.2 
Rice  17 17.0 
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Table 2. Distribution of farmers by age (in years)  
age  Crops Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Age of respondent Maize 59 20 79 43.39 
Rice 51 21 72 40.15 
 
Majority of farmers for both crops were educated up to primary school level. About 88.6% maize 
farmers and about 97.0% of rice farmers had either no formal education or no education at all (Table 3). 
This signifies farmer’s inability to effectively negotiate with well informed traders, some of whom are 
exporters. There is thus asymmetric access to market information between farmers and buyers of 
grains. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of farmers by their education level  
Education level Crops  Frequency Valid Percent 
No formal education Maize  32 24.6 
Rice  31 31.0 
Primary education Maize  84 64.6 
Rice  66 66.0 
secondary school Maize  10 7.7 
Rice  3 3.0 
Post secondary, vocational or college Maize  4 3.1 
Rice  - - 
Sample size: Maize Farmers (131) and Rice (100) 
 
3.1.2 Farm Sizes 
Table 4 indicates that unlike rice, maize is dominated by smallholder farming. Farmers owning less 
than 5 ha of land were 64.9% for maize whereas it was about 1% for rice. About 40% of rice farmers 
owned over 20 ha compared to only 4.6 maize farmers who owned over 20ha. This implies that rice 
production is more commercialized compared that of maize. That is, maize farmers are more subsistent 
compared to rice farmers.  
 
Table 4. Number of acres owned by farmers 
Farm size  Crops Frequency Valid percent 
Valid 0-5 Acres Maize  85 64.9 
Rice  1 1.0 
6-10 Acres Maize  25 19.1 
Rice  34 34.0 
11-20 Acres Maize  15 11.5 
Rice  40 40.0 
Over 20 Acres 
 
Maize  6 4.6 
Rice  17 17.0 
Sample size: Maize Farmers (131) and Rice (100) 
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3.1.3 Means of Crop Transportation 
The major means of transport for maize and rice were also found to slightly differ (Table 5). It was 
found that about 26.5% of maize farmers transport their crop on foot as compared to only 6% for rice 
farmers using same means of transport. It was further found out that motorcycles and bicycles were 
very common in transporting rice compared to transporting maize, and that use of tracks was common 
with maize farmers. The use of bicycles and motorcycles in Shinyanga is very common due to its 
landscape having no slopes as compared to Southern highlands. In addition maize is less voluminous 
but heavier compared to paddy hence need for trucks. 
 
Table 5. Means of Transport to the market place 
Transport means Crops  Frequency  Valid percent 
 On foot Maize  30 26.5 
Rice  6 6 
Motorcycle/Bicycle 
 
Maize  27 23.9 
Rice  58 58 
Commuter bus/Pick ups Maize  28 24.8 
Rice  - - 
Trucks 
 
Maize  21 18.6 
Rice  10 10 
Other means of transport Maize  7 6.2 
Rice  26 26 
Sample size: Maize Farmers (131) and Rice (100) 
 
3.1.4 Farmer’s Perception on Maize and Rice Income Levels  
Table 6 indicates that about 67.0% of both maize and rice farmers perceived incomes from these crops 
as satisfying their household’s income demand. Almost a higher proportion of farers in both subsectors 
did indicate that incomes from other crops were also providing satisfying incomes to the households. 
This is due to the fact that farmers in both study areas were also involved in the production and 
marketing of other crops like beans, rice, tea etc for Southern Highlands and also cotton, maize, 
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Table 6. Farmer perception on relative satisfaction levels of sales to household’s income demand*  







at all  
Maize sales 16(12.4) 55(42.6) 5(3.9) 41(31.8) 12(9.3) 
Rice sales 38(38.0) 29(29.0) - 29(29.0) 4(4.0) 
Sales from 
other crops 
Songea/Iringa 5(16.7) 12(40.0) 4(13.3) 8(26.7) 1(3.3) 
Kahama 40(40.0) 34(34.0) 1(1.0) 20(20.0) - 
* Figures in parentheses are percentage of the frequency distributions 
Sample size: Maize Farmers (131) and Rice (100) 
 
3.2 Farmers’ Perceptions and Experiences on the Impediments to Beneficial Trade  
3.2.1 Farmers’ Perception on Importance to Farmers of Different Buyers of Rice and Maize  
It was noted from the survey that farmers did perceive importance of various crop buyers differently. 
Table 7 shows that very important buyers of rice were other farmers (87%), nearby traders (71.0%) and 
anonymous buyers (40%) whereas for maize government department (45.3%), anonymous buyers 
(29.1%) and traders from neighboring countries (28.0%) and other farmers (22.9%) were found to be 
most important buyers. It is implied from table 6 that government department (through Food security 
department) is more important buyer of maize than of rice. It can also be noted from the table that 
unlike rice farmers, maize farmers do not have a distinctively one or few traders as the most important 
but perceive almost all evenly. This is a sign of more market fragmentation to maize compared to rice.  
 
Table 7. Farmers perception on relative importance of various buyers  






Not at all 
Important
Other Farmers  Maize  30(22.9) 25(19.1) 8(6.1) 32(24.4) 36(27.5) 
Rice 87(87.0) 1(1.0) - 29(29.0) 4(4.0) 
Anonymous Buyers  Maize  37(29.1) 44(34.6) 6(4.7) 27(21.3) 13(10.2) 
Rice 40(40.0) 34(34.0) 1(1.0) 20(20.0) 5(5.0) 
Nearby Traders  Maize  41(32.3) 27(21.3) 6(4.7) 27(21.3) 26(20.5) 
Rice 71(71.0) 16(16.0) 1(1.0) 7(7.0) 5(5.0) 
Truck Owners  Maize  31(25.0) 20(16.1) 5(4.0) 30(24.2) 38(30.6) 
Rice 18(18.0) 44(44.0) 1(1.0) 27(27.0) 10(10.0) 
Government 
Department 
Maize  58(45.3) 9(7.0)  - 25(19.5) 36(28.1) 
Rice 7(7.0) 12(12.0) 4(4.0) 36(36.0) 41(41.0) 
Milling Companies  Maize  30(23.8) 22(17.5) 6(4.8) 40(30.5) 28(22.2) 
Rice 1(14.0) 23(23.0) 4(4.0) 30(30.0) 29(29.0) 
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Traders From 
Neighboring Countries  
Maize  35(28.0) 16(12.8) 5(3.8) 33(26.4) 36(28.1) 
Rice 8(8.0) 16(16.0) 4(4.0) 30(30.0) 42(42.0) 
Food Processors Maize  28(22.4) 18(14.4) 8(6.4) 39(31.2) 32(25.6) 
Rice 10(10.0) 7(7.0) 1(1.0) 34(34.0) 48(48.0) 
Cooperative Societies  Maize  23(18.4) 11(8.4) 10(8.0) 40(32.0) 41(32.8) 
Rice 5(5.0) 4(4.0) 4(4.0) 34(34.0) 53(53.0) 
Input Suppliers  Maize  20(15.5) 15(11.6) 9(7.0) 44(34.1) 41(31.8) 
Rice 3(3.0) 5(5.0) 4(4.0) 38(38.0) 50(50.0) 
Exporters  Maize  21(16.8) 15(12.0) 10(8.0) 40(32.0) 39(31.5) 
Rice 23(23.0) 39(39.0) 3(3.0) 29(29.0) 6(6.0) 
Any Other Buyers Not 
Listed above 
Maize  23(20.0) 23(20.0) 4(3.5) 23(20.0) 42(36.1) 
Rice 17(17.0) 3(3.0) 1(1.0) 30(30.0) 46(46.0) 
*Figures in parentheses are percentage of the frequency distributions 
Sample size: Maize Farmers (131) and Rice (100) 
 
3.2.2 Farmers’ Perception on Marketing Activities in the Value Added Chain of the Crops 
Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the perception of farmers on the importance of various marketing activities and 
their implied costs respectively. It can be noted that famers indicated that almost all marketing activities 
that add value to their crops were not important to them. This implies that the marketing activities were 
not done by the farmers and were perceived to be buyers’ responsibilities. This suggests that farmers 
can rarely attract high prices of their commodities as they seem to sell primary, unprocessed crops. For 
maize, this includes selling maize farms before maturity or before harvesting. Rice farmers normally 
sold dehusked paddy to traders. In both maize and rice, rarely were farmers capable of owning storage 
facilities that would add value to their crops during shortage.  
 
Table 8. Farmers perception on relative importance of marketing activities  
Attribute  Crops Completely 
unimportant 
Unimportant Important Very 
important
Weighing and assembling Maize  59(45.7) 21(16.3) 45(34.9) 4(3.1) 
rice 56(56.0) 9(9.0) 31(31.0) 4(4.0) 
Transportation Maize  44(34.6) 24(18.9) 47(37.0) 12(9.4) 
rice 52(52.0) 4(4.0) 38(38.0) 6(6.0) 
Storage Maize  55(45.1) 23(18.9) 39(32.0) 5(4.1) 
rice 53(53.0) 5(5.0) 41(41.0) 1(1.0) 
Grading and 
classification 
Maize  69(57.0) 24(19.8) 23(19.0) 5(4.1) 
rice 84(84.0) 1(1.0) 15(15.0) - 
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Processing Maize  73(61.9) 21(17.8) 19(16.1) 5(4.2) 
rice 89(89.0) 1(1.0) 10(10.0) - 
Packaging Maize  56(46.7) 23(19.2) 37(30.8) 4(3.3) 
rice 90(90.0) 1(1.0) 9(9.0) - 
Distribution and retailing Maize  59(49.6) 28(23.5) 29(24.4 3(2.5) 
rice 86(86.0) 1(1.0) 13(13.0)  
Other stages rice 4(4.0) 82(82.0) 1(1.0) 13(13.0) 
Figures in parentheses are percentage of the frequency distributions 
Sample size: Maize Farmers (131) and Rice (100) 
 
One of the reasons for not undertaking such marketing activities was the cost implications of the 
undertakings. However, Table 8 implies that most farmers were not feeling the cost of undertaking the 
marketing activities. Majority indicated that the marketing activities were not significant costs to them. 
This is true due to the fact that farmers were not incurring these costs. The failure to undertake these 
activities leads to farmers earning very low market prices since value is added by buyers not sellers. 
 
Table 9. Farmers perception on cost implications of marketing activities*  








Weighing and Assembly Maize  38(30.9) 36(29.3) 31(25.2) 18(14.6) 
Rice - 37(37.0) 63(63.0) - 
Transportation Stage Maize  35(29.2) 40(33.3) 24(20.0) 21(17.5) 
Rice 2(2.0) 43(43.0) 55(55.0) - 
Storage Stage Maize  18(15.3) 45(33.3) 34(28.8) 21(17.8) 
Rice 1(1.0) 41(41.0) 58(58.0) - 
Grading and Classification 
Stage 
Maize  34(28.6) 30(25.2) 35(29.4) 20(16.8) 
Rice 1(1.0) 12(12.0) 87(87.0) - 
Processing Stage Maize  29(26.1) 33 (25.2) 32(29.7) 17(15.3) 
Rice 1(1.0) 8(8.0) 91(91.0) - 
Packaging Stage Maize  31(27.0) 28(24.3) 40(34.8) 16(13.9) 
Rice 1(1.0) 8(8.0) 91(91.0) - 
Distribution and Retailing Stage Maize  19(16.4) 34(29.3) 33(28.4) 30(25.9) 
rice 1(1.0) 11(11.0) 88(88.0) - 
*Figures in parentheses are percentage of the frequency distributions 
Sample size: Maize Farmers (131) and Rice (100) 
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3.2.3 Farmers’ Perception on Trade Impediments Affecting Rice and Maize Marketing 
Tables 10 indicate that farmers perceive differently the existence of the listed trade impediments. 
Majority of maize farmers seemed to have felt the government policies, existence of inadequate storage 
facilities, and existence of price controls, credit controls and local levies to be existing in their areas. 
Maize farmers perceived most of the listed impediments in table 9 as either somewhat existing or not 
existing at all. On the other hand, rice farmers found Crop transportation, quantitative restrictions, price 
setting and controls, inadequate storage facilities, credit constraints, lack of market information an 
inflation of local currency as highly existing. Unlike maize farmers, majority of rice farmers (65%) 
perceived government policy impediments not existing. Likewise maize majority of farmers did not 
perceive the following impediments as existing in their business; government policy impediments, 
trade licensing, exchange rate and inflation rate. This finding implies that rice farmers are more prone 
to facing inflation of the shilling more than their maize counter parts. With regard to border controls 
farmers in both study areas did not perceive them as existing, implying that majority were not trading 
across borders. The cross border trade seemed to have been a business carried out by traders 
(middlemen) that add value to farmers produce by performing marketing activities that conform to 
foreign market conditionality.  
 
Table 10. Perception of farmers on existence of trade impediments* 






Government Policy Impediments Maize  38(29.9) 36(28.3) 35(27.6) 18(14.2) 
Rice 65(65.0) 12(12.0) 15(15.0) 8(8.0) 
Trade Licensing  Maize  36(29.3) 32(26.0) 44(35.8) 11(8.9) 
Rice 70(70.0) 6(6.0) 21(21.0) 3(3.0) 
Crop Transportation  Maize  27(21.8) 37(29.8) 48(36.6) 12(9.7) 
Rice 18(18.0) 5(5.0) 71(71.0) 6(6.0) 
Quantitative Restrictions Maize  36(29.0) 32(25.8) 44(35.5) 12(9.7) 
Rice 36(36.0) 9(9.0) 51(51.0) 4(4.0) 
Rigid and Uncertain Regulations Maize  32(26.0) 33(26.8) 42(34.1) 16(12.2) 
Rice 58(58.0) 12(12.0) 22(22.0) 8(8.0) 
Price Setting and Controls Maize  47(37.3) 21(16.7) 48(38.1) 10(7.9) 
Rice 29(29.0) 12(12.0) 50(50.0) 9(9.0) 
Impediments to Buyers 
Competition 
Maize  43(35.2) 29(23.1) 42(34.4) 8(6.6) 
Rice 65(65.0) 13(13.0) 15(15.0) 7(7.0) 
Inadequate Storage Facilities Maize  25(20.7) 36(29.8) 46(38.0) 14(11.6) 
Rice 36(36.0) 11(11.0) 39(39.0) 14(14.0) 
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Credit Constraints  Maize  27(22.9) 32(27.1) 44(37.3) 15(12.7) 
Rice 17(17.0) 9(9.0) 65(65.0) 9(9.0) 
Lack of Market Information  Maize  39(33.9) 33(28.7) 33(28.7) 10(8.7) 
Rice 24(24.0) 17(17.0) 51(51.0) 8(8.0) 
Exchange Rate Fluctuations Maize  47(50.5) 20(21.5) 18(19.4) 8(8.6) 
Rice 76(76.0) 6(6.0) 15(15.0) 3(3.0) 
Shilling Inflation  Maize  35(35.5) 29(29.0) 24(24.0) 12(12.0) 
Rice 27(27.0) 14(14.0) 53(53.0) 6(6.0) 
Border Controls  Maize  38(31.7) 31(25.8) 37(30.8) 14(11.7) 
Rice 74(74.0) 5(5.0) 14(14.0) 6(6.0) 
Local Levies Maize  22(19.0) 39(33.6) 49(42.2) 6(5.2) 
Rice 76(76.0) 5(5.0) 13(13.0) 6(6.0) 
*Figures in parentheses are percentage of the frequency distributions 
Sample size: Maize Farmers (131) and Rice (100) 
 
3.2.4 Farmers’ Perception on Benefits of Various Crop Buyers 
Farmers were asked to assess their perception on the importance they attach to various crop buyers in 
the market. Unlike rice farmers, maize farmers perceived farm gate buyers as highly beneficial crop 
buyers. Other buyers who were perceived as beneficial to maize farmers were exporters, maize brokers, 
cooperative unions, neighboring countries and warehouse receipt systems. Only about 39% and 24% of 
rice farmers perceived farm gate buyers and cooperative unions respectively as not beneficial to trade 
with. The list of beneficial/non beneficial traders was used to model the marketing channels (models) to 
be explained the later sections of this paper. The presence of many beneficial traders suggests that these 
markets are somehow not very controlled by the state but also very fragmented and not easy to 
coordinate. 
 
Table 11. Perception of farmers on benefits of trading with different types of crop buyers* 








Farm Gate Buyers Maize  30(23.3) 14(10.9) 13(10.1) 7(5.4) 65(50.4) 
rice 36(36.0) 5(5.0) 37(37.0) 20(20.0) 2(2.0) 
Licensed Buyers Maize  10(7.9) 16(12.6) 27(21.3) 15(11.8) 59(53.5) 
rice 7(7.0) 21(21.0) 60(60.0) 12(12.0) - 
Trading with Contractual 
Buyers 
Maize  20(15.5) 21(16.0) 40(31.0) 11(8.5) 37(28.7) 
rice 9(9.0) 12(12.0) 21(21.0) 57(57.0) - 
Cooperative Unions Maize  6(4.7) 21(16.4) 23(18.0) 15(11.7) 63(49.2) 
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rice 3(3.0) 4(4.0) 24(24.0) 69(69.0) - 
Milling Companies Maize  9(7.0) 17(13.3) 27(21.1) 21(16.4) 54(42.2) 
rice 1(1.0) 8(8.0) 74(74.0) 17(17.0) - 
Buyers from the Cities Maize  14(10.7) 15(11.5) 30(22.9) 10(7.6) 62(47.3) 
rice 8(8.0) 8(8.0) 77(77.0) 6(6.0) . 
Exporters Maize  9(7.0) 11(8.6) 27(21.1) 14(10.9) 67(52.3) 
rice 2(2.0) 3(3.0) 37(37.0) 58(58.0) - 
Local Market Place Maize  20(15.5) 21(16.3) 40(31.0) 11(8.5) 37(28.7) 
rice 5(5.0) 7(7.0) 73(73.0) 15(15.0) - 
Neighboring Countries Maize  6(4.7) 21(16.4) 23(18.0) 15(11.7) 63(49.2) 
rice 1(1.0) 7 (7.0) 27(27.0) 65(65.0) - 
Maize Brokers Maize  9(7.0) 15 (11.7) 28 (21.9) 13(10.2) 63(49.2) 
rice 16(16.0) 12(12.0) 66(66.0) 6(6.0) - 
Warehouse Receipt Systems Maize  7(5.5) 12(9.4) 34(26.6) 18(14.1) 56(43.8) 
rice 1 (1.0) 4 (4.0) 12(12.0) 83(83.0) - 
*Figures in parentheses are percentage of the frequency distributions 
Sample size: Maize Farmers (131) and Rice (100) 
 
3.3 Market Models and Associated Transaction Costs for Rice and Maize 
Survey descriptive study findings were used to lead further detailed interviews and observations of the 
existing trade arrangements for both crops. The study revealed that there was no single and dominant 
market system (arrangement or channel) through which trade transactions between buyer and sellers of 
both crops were carried out. The intensity of market competition varied with the transaction 
arrangement concerned, and each arrangement was found to be efficient in its own ways. Based on the 
S-C-P theoretical model, field data were used to come up with five market channels for both staple 
grain crops. Figure 1 illustrates that the final consumer of grain (from smallholder farmer’s point of 
view) were milling companies, exporters and urban markets. These final consumers receive grain from 
any of the five different sources and some may acquire grain from more than one of these channels. For 
the purpose of this study we termed the 5 channels as Cereals Transaction Arrangements (CTA 1-5) 
through which the cereals (maize and rice) reach various final consumers in the marketing chain. We 
have briefly describe the five models of transaction arrangements in the subsequent sections. 
3.3.1 Farmer–Village Buying post–Grain Dealers–Milling Company (CTA 1) 
From the qualitative findings of this study, it is evident that the most common channel is through 
village buying posts (CTA1) whereby there are many buyers involved (middlemen, stockers and 
commission agents). Almost all farmers (95.1%) had access to this marketing channel. It was at this 
channel where various foul plays are made through self destructive competition amongst buyers. Since 
there are many sellers and buyers of crop during the harvest period in these markets, farmers do market 
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part of their stock only to have finance to meet short term family expenses, whereas buyers have to 
camp in local areas to collect small volumes on daily bases. Thus very small volumes are sold in these 
markets by individual farmers and hence the weighing devices used are not official. Quality of the grain 
is not certain in these markets since the transactions are complete where the personal relationships 
between buyer and seller end after the exchange. Many poor farmers are coned in these markets by the 
well informed urban anonymous buyers. There are many small transactions occurring between two 
transacting partners not known to each other increases transaction risks and costs of engaging in these 
markets. The small holders, if not guided, may end up selling all their food stocks in the hands of 
middlemen seeking for more volumes at any cost. It is in this channel that the government policy needs 
to focus and rescue poor farmers from selling their food stocks to the many competing buyers.  
3.3.2 Farmer–Cooperatives–Government Grain Reserve—Registered Traders—Milling Companies 
(CTA 2) 
Cereal Transaction Arrangement 2 is more closely linked to CTA1. The only difference is that this 
unlike CTA1, CTA2 is involving farmer cooperatives/union/organization. The Farmer cooperative 
society buys members’ crops and does all the marketing activities that the society can afford and pays 
the farmer the prevailing market. When interviewed some farmers were associating their marketing 
problems with lack of strong cooperative unions. However it was found out that the government 
through national grain reserve was procuring grain from cooperatives and other middlemen such as 
brokers (CTA 2) before the same reaches final consumers. This transaction arrangement was found 
beneficial in coordinating smallholder farmers and also in shielding them from unlawful traders. This 
transaction arrangement was found more common in maize than in rice transactions and it was only 
about 29.5% of farmers who were found to have used this channel. The low preference by farmers for 
this channel is attributed to the poorly managed cooperatives where members have always been ill 
treated by their own cooperatives such as inability to pay arrears on time. The policy options here 
would be for stakeholders to strengthen farmer cooperatives and farmer groups through empowering 
groups with necessary education and skills. 
3.3.3 Farmer— Commission Agents/Stockers—Milling Companies (CTA 3) 
CTA3 is the case where final grain buyers receive grain procured by various middlemen including 
commission agents and stockers. With CTA 3 the grain might have changed hands between 
stockers/commission agents who could have also bought same from farmers or from cooperatives. 
Most of these stockers do hold storage facilities at village, ward or division levels. The stockers 
sometimes keep grain for final buyers but charge fees (commission) for storage and transportation. It 
was found that only 16.2% of farmers were transacting their grain through CTA 3. The difference 
between CTA1 and CTA3 is that the latter involves long term relationship between farmers and the 
traders. This is due to the fact that traders do invest in long term fixed assets like storage facilities. 
However, due to smallness and inappropriate quality of storage faculties only a handful of the produce 
is handled. The possible policy intervention in CTA3 would be for the government and other 
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stakeholders to invest in standard storage facilities (godowns) which would increase capacity of 
farmers to increase crops’ shelf life and also add time value of the produce. Traders involved in CTA3 
are highly affected by any trade policy that restricts movements of grains outside the village or district 
boundaries since the restriction may not significantly stabilize food security to the poor smallholder 
farmers facing food shortages. 
3.3.4 Farmer—Other Farmers—Milling Companies (CTA 4) 
CTA 4 is the channel whereby some large farmers do purchase grain from other (relatively) smaller 
farmers. However these larger farmers are not stockers but can afford to sell the maize to final buyers 
in urban centers. The farmers buying maize from other farmers have access to market information and 
in most cases do invest in long term personal/social relationships with the remote, ill informed small 
farmers. Farmers engaged in buying other farmers produce and were selling the same to final 
consumers were found to be more progressive farmers, who were investing in social relationships 
neighbouring farmers. In this channels, its where such relatively larger farmers were buying farms 
owned by other farmers when the crop is at blooming stage. The poor farmers would be receiving 
financial credit from these relatively larger farmers in small installments and agree to sell the whole 
farm at prevailing market price. Possible policy intervention in this case would be to educate farmers 
on how to manage financial flows throughout the year so that they do not become “employees” of their 
neighbours. The compliance costs to these arrangements are very costly to default. Ting farmers. Such 
means of contract enforcement that were reported in the study areas were coercive means, threats to 
report to the police, and sometimes threats to bewitch the defaulting or enforcing partners. CTA 4 was 
used by about 6.9% of smallholder farmers, and it was perceived to be an increasingly popular 
marketing model especially in rice. 
3.3.5 Farmer—Milling Companies (CTA 5) 
CTA 5 represents procurement channel where milling companies/exporters or city markets buy cereals 
directly from farmers or where farmers themselves supply their crop to the milling 
companies/exporters/city markets without any middlemen involved. This channel is very commonly 
used in areas where these final buyers are located within the proximities of the farmers where transport 
cost is very minimal. This channel is also used by specialized commercial farmers and majority have 
strong social network with the markets. These include progressive farmers who undertake vertical 
integration path by producing, adding value and market the grains themselves. These farmers are large 
and are actually ones that need modern technology of production (like fertilizers and mechanized 
production), they are more educated and are capable of searching for markets in and outside the district, 
including markets across borders. Such farmers need to be promoted by reducing trade huddles. Trade 
restrictions to farmers using CTA5 are very unhealthy and it takes them a step back. These are farmers 
which would be beneficiaries of programmes like Kilimo Kwanza. This channel was however, found to 
be not very common and it was found to comprise of only about 1.6% of smallholder farmers. 
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Figure 1. Marketing channels for grain in Tanzania 
 
3.4 Transaction Costs and Related Impediments in the Value Added Chain of Maize and Rice 
It was observed that as grain marketing huddles increase with transaction cost from CTA1 to CTA 5. 
Farmers would be expected to gain more market bargain in channel 5 but due to high transaction costs 
resulting from persistent marketing impediments farmers have not used CTA5 much more as they have 
used other channels. When compared, it is obvious that Rice farmers use more of CTAs 3-5 and less of 
CTAs 1-2 whereas maize farmers sell their grains mainly through CTAs 1-2. Table 14 summarizes 
some of the quantifiable transaction costs resulting from persistent market impediments. Majority of 
transaction costs are not quantifiable e.g. frustration, fear of theft, loss of reputation/trust, etc… They 
can be summarized into three main categories as outlined in table 12. 
a) Search transaction cost - the cost of searching for the most reliable/profitable buyer of 
grain due to lack of access to market information (urban market price), low education levels 
and remoteness of farmers (distance to markets) 
b) Cost of effecting the transaction- the cost incurred during the actual exchange of 
commodity for cash e.g. assembling, grain packaging, weighing, levies, storage and 
transport charges 
c) Cost of complying with policies and trade conditions- The cost resulting from 
repercussions of breaching of the existing huddles like trade restrictions outside the district 
Village buying post Commission agents, Cooperative society / 
Unions 
Other Farmers 
Commission agents, Grain 
dealers, grain reserve, 
Coops, stockers Private trader  
CTA1 CTA2 CTA3 CTA4 CTA5 
Government Grain 
GRAIN MILLING COMPANIES, EXPORTERS, URBAN MARKETS  
CEREAL PRODUCERS: Many Smallholder farmers, 
very few medium farmers, 
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boundaries posed by local governments, fear to lose trust, forceful acceptance to use 
tempered with weighing devices etc. 
This study has revealed a long list of transaction cost as shown in table 12. It was also noted from the 
field that whether quantifiable or non quantifiable, all forms of transaction cost existed to significantly 
influence market decisions. The existence of different forms of trade impediments results into different 
forms of transaction costs. For instance farmers incurred transaction costs such as frustration, 
postharvest losses, theft etc due to their failure to easily identify reliable buyers. This is due to the 
existence of such trade impediments like lack of perfect information about the potential traders, market 
prices etc. Likewise monitoring incomplete transactions, especially when a farmer sells grain on credit, 
results into transaction cost of enforcing such contracts such as theft, witchcraft threats, unofficial 
storage charges etc. These costs do exist due to the existence of such impediments like poor assembling 
facilities, lack of storage facilities etc. The mechanisms used to sanction defaulters are also a source of 
transaction costs. For instance witchcraft consequences were believed to be an instrument to threaten 
one who would either be enforcing for being paid or those who would not want to pay. The informal 
mechanisms do exist because of the existing impediments such as corrupt legal system and police force, 
trade restrictions etc. All these, if significant, were impeding effective trade of the two grains to the 
extent that some traders would abscond any dealings with certain farmers for fear of the unknown 
consequences. 
 
Table 12. Trade impediments and their associated transaction costs in the study areas 
Costs Impediment Transaction cost 
Cost of searching/screening 
potential/reputable 
transacting partner  
 lack of access to market information 
(urban market price) 
 low education levels 
 remoteness of farmers 
 Frustration 
 Postharvest losses 
 Theft(grain + cash) 
 Low prices 
 Cheating on weight 
 High transport 
Cost of monitoring 
contractual agreements to 
avoid loss or breach 
 Poor assembling, 
 Lack of storage facilities 
 Grain packaging,  
 
 Weighing charges,  
 Local levies,  
 Storage charges  
 Transport charges 
 Theft (cash) 
 Witchcraft/death  
Cost of enforcing the contract 
when contracts are breached 
 Trade restrictions outside the district 
boundaries 
 Corruption  
 Lack of best alternative to livelihood 
 fear to lose trust,  
 Run away  
 Low prices 
 Coercive threats 
 Crop switch 
 Witchcraft/death 
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It can also be seen in table 13 that transaction costs increase with CTAs. It is likely that transaction cost for 
searching potential buyers by farmers was negligible for CTA1 compared to higher levels of similar cost for 
CTA5. Similarly CTA1 seemed to have no transaction, neither cost for monitoring contracts nor for 
enforcing contracts as the transactions involved small volumes of grain and were complete (cash 
transactions). CTA5 on the other hand seemed to have higher costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts 
due to existence of interdependence between farmer and trader which results from large volumes involved 
and incompleteness of contracts.  
 
Table 13. Perceived transaction cost for each CTA 
Costs CTA1 CTA2 CTA3 CTA4 CTA5 
Cost of searching/screening 
potential/reputable transacting 
partner  
Very Low Low Medium medium High 
Cost of monitoring contractual 
agreements to avoid loss or breach 
NA low High low Very high 
Cost of enforcing the contract 
when contracts are breached 
NA Low Very high low Very 
 
3.5 Cereal Transaction Arrangements (CTAs) in the Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) Market 
Model for Maize and Rice  
Using the S-C-P market model, it was possible was used to illustrate how the five CTAs were linked to the 
market structure, market conduct and market performance for maize and rice marketing. Table 14 shows that 
the market structure for CTA1 is characterised of numerous (small) transactions and that it is easier to enter 
the market and transact through CTA1 compared to CTA5. As noted before, only 1.6% of farmers were 
transacting through CTA5 whereas majority of farmers (95.1%) were trading through CTA1. The market 
conduct was observed through recognition of interdependence between farmers and traders. It was evident 
that extent of recognition of interdependence increased from CTA1 to CTA5. This is explained by the fact 
that trading in CTA1 could not provide room for long term interpersonal relationship as transactions were 
almost complete. With CTA5 long contractual agreements would be made between farmer and buyer and 
majority of the contracts would be incomplete hence need for interdependence between the two sides. As 
also explained earlier the market performance measured in terms of perceived technical efficiency, 
progressiveness and earnings, transacting through CTA5 was found to higher levels of these indicators 
compared to other CTAs. Majority of farmers were trading through CTA1 although it seemed to have the 
lowest levels of market performance.  
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Cereal transaction arrangement (CTA) 
CTA1 CTA2 CTA3 CTA4 CTA5 
Market Structure 
number of transactions Numerous Less numerous Few Few Very few 
Entry conditions Easy Membership Moderate Moderate Difficult 












Optional strategies NA Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market Performance 
Technical efficiency Very low High Moderate moderate High 
Progressiveness Very low Low low Variable High 
Earnings Very low Normal low normal Above normal
 
Table 15 summarizes some of the indicators of quantifiable determinants of transaction costs. For 
instance though it was not common for maize, in rice some farmers were renting the farms to a tune of 
up to TSh 150,000 per acre per season. However, the interviews indicated that access to farm land 
wasn’t a big huddle. The nominal prices for both crops from 2009 to 2012 seem to have risen but the 
percentage increment has been smaller compared to inflation rate between the two seasons. For 
instance the average prices per 100Kg bag of maize between 2009 and 2012 seemed to have risen by 
49.8% i.e. from TShs 25,500 in 2009 to TSh 38,200 in 2012. However, the inflation rate between the 
same period has more than tripled (> 300%) i.e. from about 6% in 2009 to over 18% in 2012. Some 
farmers were found to increase net revenues by increasing acreage and sale crops at relatively higher 
(inflated prices) to buyers who were exporting to neighbouring countries to offset declining real prices, 
keeping other factors unchanged. However, the negative impact of increasing inflation was also noted 
from farmer interviews due to the fact that inflation was associated with increased transport costs, 
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Table 15. Descriptive statistics of transaction costs determinants in marketing rice and maize 
Attribute  Crops Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Payment per acre per season Maize - - - - 
Rice 150000 0 150000 13,100 
Number of bags in 2011/2012 Maize 3 1 4 2.64 
Rice 3 1 4 2.92 
Price per 100Kg bag of crop in 2009 Maize 37500 12500 50000 25,500 
Rice 80000 0 80000 31,400 
Price per 100Kg bag of crop in 2010 Maize 37500 12500 50000 27,800 
Rice 60000 0 60000 34,600 
Price per 100Kg bag of crop in 2011 Maize 45000 15000 60000 33,800 
Rice 85000 0 85000 40,100 
Price per 100Kg bag of crop in in 2012 Maize 20000 30000 50000 38,200 
Rice 95000 0 95000 30,700 
Distance to reach market (km) Maize 220 0 220 21.40 
Rice 39.5 .5 40.0 8.195 
Time (hours) spent to reach the 
market 
Maize 4000 0 4000 153.08 
Rice 3.5 .5 4.0 1.420 
Transport of 100kg bag of crop to 
market place 
Maize 59500 500 60000 4722.40
Rice 5000.00 .00 5000.00 1,476 
Payment per season for storage facility 
(TShs) 
Maize 149800 200 150000 11,200 
Rice 30000 0 30000 554.56 
 
It was also noted that access to market places, irrespective of CTA was a significant determinant of 
transaction cost. On average a maize farmer would travel up to 21 Km and 8km for rice farmer to reach 
a nearby market. This implies that volume of transactions has to be small due to transport costs and also 
due to lack of reliable transport means. Other determinants of transaction costs as indicated in Table 15 
were storage cost, but as noted before, storage was only done CTAs1-5 and more so for CTA5. Such 
costs were minimal or legible for CTA1 due to completeness of trade contracts and lack of 
interdependence between transacting partners. 
 
4. Conclusion and Recommendation 
Literature on obstacles and impediments to beneficial trade in rice and maize crops in Tanzania is by 
far well documented. Irrespective of the fact that each of the previous studies have 
recommended—seemingly, pro poor policy interventions by both government and private sector, it is 
likely that they have not solved the core problem of lack of beneficial trade. In fact the withdraw of the 
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state controls of the market for these commodities is viewed to have negatively affected production and 
hence benefits to the smallholder farmers. This paper has adopted a different approach by examining 
the root causes of the existing obstacles in form of transactions costs. It was not the intention of this 
paper to reveal exactly what is already known in literature as obstacles to beneficial trade. The 
methodology adopted in research that came up with this paper, and the presentation style is an added 
value to the existing literature.  
This paper has alerted policy makers to understand that the markets for these staple grains are 
fragmented. There are many stylized markets referred to in this paper as Cereal Transaction 
Arrangements (CTAs). This paper has revealed five CTAs for rice and maize and that all these are 
happening at the same time and place, and sometimes involve same individuals. Each of these CTAs 
has its own strengths and weaknesses hence no single policy can be more appropriate across all CTAs. 
It is the responsibility of all involved in ensuring that crafted trade policies do not favour some CTA at 
the expense of others. For instance, whereas it could be justifiable to impose trade restrictions beyond 
village borders for CTA1 (where uninformed poor farmers may end up selling food stocks), the same 
policy is a serious hurdle for farmers engaged in CTA5, who seem to be knowledgeable and 
progressive. Thus the policies must be as heterogeneous to reflect heterogeneity of smallholder farmers 
hence market transactions arrangements.  
It is also recommended that more research should be done to model markets for food crops in Tanzania. 
It is evident that the traditional theoretical models like S-C-P Market Model, Transaction Cost 
economics or even the neoclassical perfect competition models cannot be very reliable when applied 
independently. This paper has applied a mixture of all these to come up with the five different 
transaction arrangements for the two staple crops. Other researchers should therefore undertake more 
research to quantitatively study the applicability of the identified market models. Further studies too 
need to inform policy makers on specific policies that can be applied to meet demands of the various 
markets (CTAs) within one locality.  
This paper has, like other previous studies on this topic such as that of Fafchamps (2004), found more 
or less similar trade hurdles. However, the paper argues that the hurdles are in themselves an 
opportunity for some other traders and farmers. It was found that some traders and farmers could 
transform trade hurdles into opportunities by exploiting those farmers and traders hardly hit by the 
hurdles in place. For instance relatively larger and wealthy farmers trading under CTA3 
(Farmer—Farmer—final buyer) were utilizing their close proximity to poor farmers who could not 
afford to transport the grain to distant markets. The larger farmers would be able to store excess grain, 
transport and sometimes able to access potential buyers from the nearby urban markets. These farmer 
traders were viewed by surrounding poor farmers as the most important buyers and some wished that 
the government could enable them (farer traders) to avoid anything that could affect their businesses. 
The government, in this case ought to reduce transactions costs to such farmers engaged in CTA4 and 
also CTA5 that results from cost of constructing warehouses, corruption, levies and trade restrictions. 
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